Destruction of a Nation–the Arguable Failure of US Presence in Afghanistan

Introduction

After the attack on the Twin Towers by Al-Qaeda operatives sequestered in Afghanistan, the US airstrikes and troops retook the country by the end of 2001. This analysis evaluates why US foreign policy in Afghanistan from 2001, focusing on whether intended objectives, seen through the liberal framework, were not achieved before the 2021 troop withdrawal. A liberal framework encompasses the emphasis on cooperation between the US and the Taliban, highlighted in speeches by both Bush and Obama (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021) (whitehouse.gov, 2016). The time frame has also been set to post-2001 in order to accurately recount cooperation efforts between the US and various actors within Afghanistan after the majority of Talib and Al-Qaeda forces had been defeated, as well as to rule out any lack of cooperation on account of reduced attention due to active interventions in Iraq.

Evaluating the Past and Present

High casualties

With some US strikes on misidentified civilians resulting in high casualties (Crawford, 2020), citizens grew resentful of the US presence, resulting in Taliban resurgence. US foreign policy in Afghanistan also largely failed to adequately address regional dynamics; Afghan politics had been shaped by warlords and leaders advocating for sub-ethnicities rather than all Afghan citizens (Roy, 2003) so the idea of democracy was associated with Western intervention and brought forth negative sentiments among the population (Larson, 2011).

Afghan-US cooperation, corruption and loss of faith

Furthermore, a lack of cooperation between the US and Afghan officials in the security sector contributed to a loss of faith in US-style governance and aid, as a 2008 report by the US Government Accountability Office found that due to a lack of funding in logistics sectors with a simultaneous over-funding of others led corruption to lay rampant in the Afghan police force. Some Afghan policemen even believed it was US overfunding fueling the corruption leading to further distrust (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2021). Moreover, lack of funding in certain sectors led to insufficient reconstruction, which led to further disillusionment among the Afghan public and a possible rise in extremist sentiment. In addition to all of this, by constantly consulting and then ignoring Afghan government goals and capacities, the US did not allow the government any chance to build its capabilities. As air strikes increased during the Trump administration, these were the only means the Afghan government had of holding back Talib forces. The rapid withdrawal of these before Afghan-Talib negotiations took place resulted in a stronger Taliban (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2021).

Conclusion and Future Considerations

Considering the liberal framework, the occupation had been a failure as it had not achieved a cooperative environment between actors to achieve mutual needs. Through cultural and financial shortcomings, the US has led to a resurgence of Taliban forces after a relatively swift defeat. For future considerations, it is advisable that a culture of acceptance in the face of failure is not only encouraged but expected to ensure all agencies are held accountable and able to progress effectively. More thorough monitoring and evaluation systems, as well as cooperation between agencies to allow for better decisions made on the ground are crucial to maintaining cooperative relations with locals at individual, and thus national levels in future interventions.

Reference list

Afghan Peace Process. (n.d.). Available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/594b78142cba5e5e2be283bf/t/60897f522a2ef65d9981c969/1619623765897/ITS+%7C+USFP+Afghan+Peace+Process+Diplomatic+Brief.pdf [Accessed 21 Jul. 2023].

Council on Foreign Relations (2021). A Timeline of the U.S. War in Afghanistan. [online] Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan.

Crawford, N. (2020). Afghanistan’s Rising Civilian Death Toll Due to Airstrikes. [online] pp.2017–2020. Available at: https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2020/Rising%20Civilian%20Death%20Toll%20in%20Afghanistan_Costs%20of%20War_Dec%207%202020.pdf.

Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, B. of P.A. (2003). U.S. Support for Afghan Women, Children, and Refugees (June 2003). [online] 2001-2009.state.gov. Available at: https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/wi/rls/22436.htm [Accessed 21 Jul. 2023].

Integrated Country Strategy Afghanistan FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. (n.d.). Available at: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ICS_SCA_Afghanistan_Public-Release.pdf.

Roy, O. (2003). AFGHANISTAN: INTERNAL POLITICS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DYNAMICS AND GROUPINGS. [online] Available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3e9ae5535.pdf.

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (2021). What We Need To Learn: Lessons From Twenty Years Of Afghanistan Reconstruction. [online] Available at: https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-21-46-LL.pdf.

whitehouse.gov. (2016). Statement by the President on Afghanistan. [online] Available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/06/statement-president-afghanistan.

www.usatoday.com. (n.d.). Inside the U.S. military’s raid against its own security guards that left dozens of Afghan children dead. [online] Available at: https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2019/12/29/security-guards-afghan-warlords-mass-civilian-casualties/2675795001/.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ARLINGTON VA, 2021. SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.